How the NSA (may have) put a backdoor in RSA’s cryptography: A technical primer
Jan 6, 2014Nick Sullivan

Summary
This post delves into the technical details of cryptographic backdoors, specifically focusing on the Dual_EC_DRBG algorithm and how a pseudo-random number generator can be intentionally weakened. It explains the concept of backdoors, the importance of unpredictable random number generation for security (especially in SSL/TLS), and illustrates how elliptic curves can be manipulated to create predictable outputs. The post highlights the risks associated with proprietary or un-auditable cryptographic components and implicitly advocates for transparency and open-source solutions in security.
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